Gender Bias Claims in Farm Service Agency’s Lending Decisions by Escalante, Cesar L. et al.
Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 34(2):332–349 
Copyright 2009 Western Agricultural Economics Association 
 
 
Gender Bias Claims in Farm Service 
Agency’s Lending Decisions 
 
Cesar L. Escalante, James E. Epperson, and Uthra Raghunathan 
 
 
This study analyzes the courts’ denial of women farmers’ motion for class-action certifi-
cation of their lawsuits alleging gender discrimination in Farm Service Agency (FSA) 
lending decisions. The plaintiffs’ claim of “commonality” of circumstances in women 
farmers’ dealings with FSA is tested using a four-year sampling of Georgia FSA loan 
applications. The econometric framework has been developed after accounting for the 
separability of loan approval and amount decisions, as well as endogeneity issues through 
instrumental variable estimation. This study’s results do not produce overwhelming evi-
dence of gender bias in FSA loan approval decisions and in favor of the “commonality” 
argument among Georgia FSA farm loan applicants. 
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Women farmers—previously relegated to roles as their spouses’ “helpmates” usually per-
forming office management and clerical chores—are fast emerging as a significant force in 
U.S. agriculture as more females take over farm businesses acquired through either 
inheritance or purchases, and assume more active roles in farm business management (Korb, 
2005; Hoffman and Norton, 2005; Sommer, 2001). Periodic nationwide surveys conducted by 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) between 1978 and 2002 report an average 
growth rate of 18.62% every five years for the number of female-operated farms. The entry 
rates into farming among women operators were found to be higher than exit rates, thus 
accounting for the steady growth in female-controlled farming operations over the past 
several years (Korb). 
  In transcending previous stereotypes of supporting roles to their spouses, female farm 
operators are generally faced with many barriers to business survival and success. Credit is 
one of these challenges. A recent analysis conducted by the Experian National Score Index on 
gender differences in credit behavior indicates women are actually more creditworthy than 
their male counterparts. In 2006, women’s average credit score was calculated at 682, which 
is seven points higher than the men’s average rating (Tedeschi, 2007; Experian, 2006). A 
study carried out by the Consumer Federation of America in December 2006, however, 
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credit terms, as women borrowers have a higher probability of being charged subprime 
interest rates
1 by lenders than male borrowers (Guy, 2007; Tedeschi). 
  Gender bias was allegedly more overt in the past. Prior to the passage of the 1974 Equal 
Credit Opportunity Act, a wife’s income was usually discounted by 50% when lenders 
evaluated mortgage applications (Schafer and Ladd, 1981). The discount rate became even 
larger when the wife was of child-bearing age and/or when the family still included pre-
school children. Several more recent studies on entrepreneurship are in similar agreement in 
their findings that women entrepreneurs striving to enter self-employment were usually dis-
advantaged by their gender through overt discrimination by bank lenders (Fay and Williams, 
1993; Carter and Kolvereid, 1997). 
  The female borrowers’ credit standing with the Farm Service Agency (FSA), the U.S. 
government’s lending arm to the farm sector, has become a case of interest. In 2000, several 
women farmers filed a suit against the USDA alleging gender bias in the administration of 
FSA lending programs. Their lawsuit, known as the Love v. Johanns case, is actually just one 
of several discrimination complaints lodged against the agency (Fox, 2006; Dunne, 2006). 
The most prominent, thus far, is the Pigford v. Glickman case, a class-action suit involving 
thousands of African-American farmers (Bennett, 2001; Mittal and Powell, 2000). The suit 
ended in an amicable settlement in 1999, and cost the government almost $1 billion in 
remunerations and relief payments to successful plaintiffs. 
  Recently, the plaintiffs in the Love v. Johanns suit failed in their own bid to duplicate the 
African-American farmers’ feat, as their motion and subsequent appeal for class-action 
certification of their suit were denied by judicial courts. Currently under litigation at the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia, the case continues to draw media attention and 
reiterates the need for scrutiny of FSA’s lending policies and decisions (Fox, 2006; Dunne, 
2006). 
  This study derives its motivation from the allegations of gender bias made by the women 
plaintiffs against the FSA, the judicial courts’ contention of a “lack of commonality” in the 
evidence presented by the plaintiffs, and the corroborating testimonies provided by approxi-
mately 2,000 female witnesses across the country. We utilize a localized data set of Georgia 
FSA borrowers from 1999–2002, in lieu of a national FSA borrower data set which is 
difficult, if not impossible, to compile. The data set supplied by the Georgia FSA state office 
allows for the identification of significant determinants of loan approval decisions made by 
FSA lending officers. Among probable determinants are proxy variables for financial 
performance measures conventionally used by commercial lenders in evaluation of loan 
applications, demographic and structural variables that capture the influence of gender, and 
other relevant attributes such as race, size, and lending program in decisions made by FSA 
loan officers. The following sections discuss further the study motivations and empirical 
frameworks and present the econometric results and implications. 
 
Capturing Bias in Lending Decisions 
 
Biases in lending decisions can be manifested as either noneconomic or statistical dis-
crimination (Berkovec et al., 1994). Noneconomic bias is a lender’s prejudicial decision 
influenced by dislike for a certain demographic group. Statistical discrimination is based on 
                                                 
1 Subprime interest rates are far above prime mortgage rates. For instance, in 2005, the prime interest rate was 5.87%, while the subprime 




the preconceived notion that certain minority groups are more likely to falter on loan 
obligations than others, such that lenders use a demographic variable (associated with the 
minority group) as a proxy for creditworthiness in marginal cases, after taking into account 
the applicants’ financial performance and credit histories (Lacker, 1995). While statistical 
discrimination is consistent with any lender’s goal of profit maximization,
2 it is nonetheless 
as illegal as noneconomic discrimination. As Ardalan (2006, p. 31) clarifies, “It is legitimate 
to consider the observable characteristics of a loan applicant that are related to his or her 
ability to pay back a loan, but it is illegitimate to use the average observable characteristics of 
a group to make inferences about the unobservable characteristics of an individual associated 
with that group.” 
  Our investigation focuses on the prejudicial or noneconomic discrimination argument 
presented by Becker (1971) and Arrow (1973) whereby a higher expected profitability (or 
risk-reduction) requirement is imposed for loans granted to minorities and eventually results 
in an observable improvement in loan performance for the group, after controlling for other 
factors affecting credit quality. This idea can be illustrated using the following lending 
decision framework developed by Berkovec et al. (1994) and modified for the purpose of our 
study: 
 
(1)                     C = Xb + u, 
 
where C is a creditworthiness index that is used to make approval or rejection decisions on 
loan applications; X is a vector of loan, borrower, and farm business characteristics (including 
historical financial performance, security arrangements, and credit records, among others) 
analyzed by lending officers; b is the coefficient vector; and u is a random error term 
observed by lenders, but unobservable to others. 
  In this model, even borrowers with the same level of C can possibly have different default 
risks and loan application outcomes due to differences in the value of the unobservable error 
term. Following this idea, noneconomic discrimination against a certain minority group 
occurs when the cutoff level for acceptable C (threshold of acceptance) is raised for them 
relative to other borrowers while holding Xb constant. This is made possible by significant 
increases in the value of the average error term (u) for the victimized class of borrowers. As a 
result, certain borrowers from this minority group who could have qualified under the true C 
threshold level (applied to other borrowers) are demoted to the rejected loan category. 
 
Objective and Subjective Credit Risk Assessment 
 
Several studies of credit risk assessment methods used by regular, commercial lenders 
emphasize the importance of credit scoring models in making loan approval decisions. 
Measures of liquidity, solvency, profitability, efficiency, and repayment are generally used to 
collectively arrive at a credit score for classifying borrowers across a range of categories that 
determine success or failure of loan applications (Miller and LaDue, 1989; Turvey, 1991; 
Kohl, 2003). Such guidelines are designed to provide an objective basis for measuring credit 
risk and evaluating loan applications.   
                                                 
2 The FSA, being a federal government agency, is more concerned about risk reduction rather than the profit maximization objective which 
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  Yet, even with established, objective standards, lending decisions still may be influenced 
by the lending officer’s subjective biases. The error term in the creditworthiness equation (1), 
for instance, can capture heuristics, rules of thumb, or principles acquired by lending officers 
over time that may be factored into the lending decision model beyond established credit risk 
assessment criteria (Gustafson, Beyer, and Saxowsky, 1991; Miller and LaDue, 1989). 
 
FSA Lending Framework 
 
The administration and implementation of FSA lending programs are based on federal guide-
lines that define departure points between federal and commercial lending. Specifically, credit 
rationing and risk assessment practices often associated with private lenders have less 
significance to FSA lending decisions. Important facets of the FSA lending framework are 
discussed in the following sections. 
 
FSA Credit Risk Assessment  
 
The FSA basic notion of creditworthiness is consistent with the traditional definition that 
included having “(1) character, industry, and ability to carry out the proposed operation, (2) 
honesty in endeavoring to carry out obligations associated with the loan” (USDA/FSA, 1995, 
p. 1; also in USDA/FSA, 1997a,b), and (3) realistic payment plans. However, FSA provides 
special considerations for the following circumstances in defining “historical credit 
delinquency” or “unacceptable credit history” for borrowers who: 
 
    ■ have been unable to pay previous loans or have delinquent payments due to 
temporary circumstances such as job loss, loss of benefits or other income, and 
increase in living expenses due to illness, injury, or death (USDA/FSA, 1995, 
1997a,b); or 
 
    ■  have no previous credit history (USDA/FSA, 1995). 
 
More often than not, these special considerations represent grounds for outright rejections 
among commercial lenders. In the FSA case, then, the error term in the creditworthiness 
equation can be expanded through the addition of such special considerations. 
 
Targeting of Underserved Borrowers 
 
FSA lending programs are guided by the government mission to assist underserved sectors of 
the farm economy. Among its clientele are beginning farmers who are unable to obtain loans 
from commercial lenders because of insufficient net worth and/or credit history. The FSA 
also services the credit requirements of established, seasoned farm operators whose 
businesses have been plagued by financial setbacks due to natural disasters or economic 
downturns. Through the “credit-elsewhere” test that screens potential borrowers,
3 FSA 
maintains a clientele of high-risk, yet creditworthy, farmers experiencing difficulty in gaining 
credit access through regular lending channels (USDA/FSA, 2003).   
                                                 




  In order to ensure fair access to federal credit funds, FSA is mandated by law to set aside 
funds to target socially disadvantaged (SDA) farmers. The Agricultural Credit Act of 1987 
defined these SDA borrowers to include racial/ethnic groups and women (Koenig and Dodson, 
1999). The Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990 expanded the SDA 




FSA lending programs are also constrained by funding availability and standard loan provi-
sions set by federal regulations. Hence, the credit rationing paradigm ordinarily used by 
commercial lenders has very limited application to the FSA lending framework. 
  Each program has a stipulated borrowing cost that is invariably applied to all loan 
accounts of a given loan type, thus eliminating interest rate as a risk management and credit 
rationing device. Other provisions of the loan covenant, such as loan maturity, foreclosure 
conditions, and prepayment/default penalties, are standard among all borrowing accounts. 
  Finite funding allocations that are available only for a specific period of time also restrict 
loan approval and disbursement decisions (USDA/FSA, 2004). These allocations, which are 
part of the USDA budget, are appropriated by Congress in each fiscal year (spanning from 
October 1st to September 30th of the following year). The FSA then distributes these funding 
appropriations to state offices based on each state’s potential demand for FSA loans. In the 
event where a certain loan program starts to run low on funding or where many states have 
already exhausted funding allocations, the FSA can resort to pooling of funds. This is done by 
placing all unused money from states in surplus into a National Headquarters pool that can be 
either redistributed among all states or disbursed on a loan-by-loan basis to states making 
such requests. Congress can also pass a supplemental appropriations bill to make more funds 
available. Otherwise, approved loan applications in any given year must wait to be funded 
during the next fiscal year when new appropriations become available. 
 
Borrower Discrimination Lawsuits 
 
Over the past decade, numerous lawsuits based on allegations of discriminatory lending 
practices have been filed against the FSA. The complainants claimed differential treatment 
(vis-à-vis other borrower groups) in the handling, approval, and servicing of loan applica-
tions. Among the borrowers’ complaints are higher probability of denial of loan applications, 
longer processing times for loan applications, use of more conservative (higher) yield calcula-
tion methods resulting in understated projected crop yields, and significant disparity between 




The majority of complaints were racially motivated. The most popular of these suits was the 
Pigford v. Glickman case, which originated from litigations against the USDA/FSA in August 
1997 for two discrimination suits filed by African-American farmers (Vina and Cowan, 2005; 
Bennett, 2001; Mittal and Powell, 2000). The farmers’ individual lawsuits were upgraded into 
a class-action federal suit that consolidated the African-American farmers’ grievances over 
decades of discrimination by FSA loan officers in “denying, delaying, or otherwise frustrating 
African-American farmers’ applications for farm loans and other credit or benefit programs” Escalante, Epperson, and Raghunathan  FSA Gender Bias Claims   337 
 
 
[U.S. Government Accountability Office (U.S. GAO), 2006, p. 1]. The USDA and the 
farmers’ lawyers eventually reached an out-of-court settlement in January 1999, under which 
a consent decree laid out a framework for the settlement of eligible (upheld) claims within a 
five-year rectification period starting in 1999 (U.S. GAO; Vina and Cowan; Bennett; Mittal 
and Powell). During this five-year period, farmers’ claims and allegations were reviewed by 
the USDA, and remunerations—in cash, noncredit awards, or debt relief benefits—were 
released to successful claimants. As of October 2007, the USDA had reviewed 22,642 cases, 
of which 15,229 were approved to receive a total of over $960 million in relief payments 
(Office of the Monitor, 2007). 
  The USDA also dealt with other sporadic, individual racially motivated lawsuits from 
some African-American farmers (Steil, 2001) and other racial minority groups such as 
Hispanic farmers involved in such lawsuits as Williams v. Glickman in 1995 (Bennett, 2001) 
and Garcia v. Glickman in 2000 (Dyckman, 2002), and Native American farmers who filed 
the only other class-action suit, Keepseagle v. Glickman, in 1999 (U.S. GAO, 2006). None of 
these, however, experienced the same stature and success as the Pigford v. Glickman case. 
  Racial bias in FSA lending decisions was explored in an earlier study by Escalante et al. 
(2006) using a localized data set of FSA loan applications. Their study did not uncover 
convincing evidence of racial bias in loan approval decisions, and further noted that the lower 
loan approval rate experienced by nonwhite farmer applicants resulted from weaker financial 




In October 2000, a number of women farmers led by Rosemary Love from Harlem, Montana, 
sued the USDA for gender discrimination in the administration of FSA farm loan programs. 
The plaintiffs in this suit, known as the Love v. Johanns case, are classified under three 
categories of women applicants who: (a) were not provided loan applications; (b) were denied 
an initial farm loan; and (c) received an initial loan but “were denied servicing, had difficulty 
obtaining subsequent loan servicing, or received less loan servicing than needed” (Fox, 2006). 
In January 2004, the women plaintiffs, supported by nearly 2,000 declarations from other 
women farmers across the country, filed a motion for class certification for the first two of the 
above three grievance categories with the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 
(Fox; Dunne, 2006). The motion was denied by the Court later that year and was subse-
quently referred to the U.S. Court of Appeals. Eventually, the higher court did not act 
favorably on the female farmers’ motion and appeal. The rationale for the denial of the class 
certification motion at several stages of the filing and appeals process are summarized in the 
following excerpts from the U.S. Court of Appeals’ (2006) decision: 
 
…[T]he declarants allege that USDA officials told them ‘they were too early to apply for 
a loan, too late to apply for a loan, that they need not bother filling out an application 
because they were not eligible to receive a loan, or that their husbands should apply.’… 
Certainly these allegations may give the declarants standing to bring individual suits … 
(but) did not require the District Court to infer the existence of a ‘common policy of dis-
crimination’ that affected non-declarants, as well… (pp. 10–11). 
  The District Court was well within the bounds of its discretion to find a lack of com-
monality where two out of every five of the Appellants’ own declarants—to say nothing 
of the silent non-declarants—would be forced to prove at trial that individual reasons for 




As a result of this decision, the female farmer cases have been referred back to the District 
Court where they are currently under litigation. 
 
FSA Borrower Data 
 
This analysis draws from some aspects of the methodology used in an earlier FSA study on 
racial minority lending trends (Escalante et al., 2006) and utilizes an expanded data set 
(relative to the previous study) of rejected loan observations and a randomly re-drawn subset 
of approved loan applications using stratified sampling techniques.
4 The current empirical 
model includes the financial performance variables used in the previous study derived from 
commercial lender traditional credit risk assessment models. The empirical analysis also 
considers the influence of gender and other borrower/loan attributes (such as farm size, race, 
loan program, and location) on lending officer decisions. 
  Table 1 presents a summary of the approval and rejection rates of the entire sample and 
subgroupings according to racial and gender classifications. The data set consists of 367 loan 
applications filed with the agency from 1999 through 2002. In terms of racial classification, 
white farmers comprise the majority (85.83%) of the study sample with 315 observations. 
The dominant gender class is the male borrower with 88.01% of the sample (323 observa-
tions). The data set has a loan approval rate of 57.22% (210 out of 367 loan applications). 
  The borrower data used in this study were obtained from the loan application database of 
the Georgia FSA state office for the period 1999–2002. The data set consists of a sampling of 
approved and rejected loan applications which were compiled using separate sampling tech-
niques. The Georgia FSA state office supplied a subset of 210 approved loan observations
5 
compiled by the agency using simple random sampling procedures. 
  The 157 rejected loan observations (which were fully documented) were taken from a 
database of 330 records of documented rejections of loan applications filed with the agency 
during the four-year period, made available by the FSA. This total figure of 330 partially and 
fully documented loan denials is actually understated given undocumented cases of rejection 
and application withdrawals. It is possible that loan rejection may have occurred even before 
borrowers could submit loan application documents. Such decisions, probably based primar-
ily on basic program eligibility considerations, could have been made by loan officers after a 
quick phone call or a short interview with prospective borrowers. 
  As a result of the understated aggregate loan rejection numbers, the proportion of this 
study’s sample of (documented) rejections relative to total (documented) loan rejections in 
Georgia (47.48%) is much larger than the proportion of the study’s loan approval sample to 
the actual number of FSA loan approvals during the study’s four-year period (table 1). The 
denied loan observations used in this study consist of applications with complete, usable 
records maintained by the eight FSA district offices in the state. More than half of the loan 
rejection records contain very minimal information (hence, were unusable and discarded for 
the purposes of this study). 
  The data used in this study were extracted by the FSA state office from borrower declara-
tions in income statements, balance sheets, and application forms filled out and submitted to 
the FSA by prospective borrowers. Portfolio data were verified by FSA loan officers through 
tax returns, lien searches, and credit checks.   
                                                 
4 Stratified sampling was used by FSA by separately and randomly drawing from databases of approved loan applications filed by male and 
female farm operators. This technique was employed to ensure that adequate observations from female borrowers, comprising less than 15% 
of the entire database, would be available for this study. 































Proportion of Sample 
Approvals and Rejections 
to Total Georgia FSA 
Approvals and Rejections 
 (%) 
a 
Approved Rejected  Approved  Rejected 
All Loans  210  157  57.22  57.22  7.85  47.48 
White Borrowers  189  126  60.00  51.50  7.06  38.18 
Non-White Borrowers    21    31  40.38    5.72  0.78    9.39 
Male Borrowers  181  142  56.04  49.32  6.76  43.03 
Female Borrowers    30    14  68.18  8.17  1.12    4.24 
 
a Rejection numbers are based only on documented cases of rejections. During the four-year period, Georgia FSA had a 





Econometric techniques are employed to identify the most appropriate model consistent with 
the nature of FSA loan approval decision and loan amount determination processes.
6 A 
Heckman model, using maximum-likelihood estimation, is adopted to test for the separability 
or independence of these two decisions made by FSA lending officers. An instrumental 
variable probit (IV probit) approach then explores the simultaneity of these two decisions by 
accommodating the endogeneity of the loan amount variable in the loan approval equation. A 
straightforward probit model is also formulated to resolve independence and endogeneity 




The basic probit approach is a binary choice model used to empirically identify the deter-
minants of FSA officer loan approval decisions. The fundamental tenet of loan approval 
decisions is that a loan officer approves a loan application if the expected utility of loan 
approval is greater than the expected utility of rejecting the loan application. Since the 
expected utility of approving a loan application is unobservable, we model the difference 
between the expected utility of loan approval and rejection decisions as: 
 
(2)                    




i z is the unobservable variable, xi is a vector representing the variables that affect 
likelihood of approval of a loan application, β′ is a vector incorporating the corresponding 
parameters, and ε is assumed to have a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 1. 
                                                 
6 The previous study on FSA racial minority lending (Escalante et al., 2006) used a binomial logistic model that considered loan approval 




  The binary dependent variable can be defined as z = 1, if 
*
i z  > 0, otherwise z = 0. In this 
analysis, the dichotomous dependent variable takes a value of 1 for approved loan applica-
tions and 0 for denials. It follows that: 
 












where F is the cumulative distribution function of ε (Greene, 2003). Since a normal distri-
bution is assumed for ε, the model’s probit form is estimated here. The probit distribution is 
given by 
 








where φ represents the standard normal distribution. A maximum-likelihood procedure is 
used to estimate the parameters of the above binary choice model. Because the estimated 
coefficients arising from these regressions are not marginal effects, additional calculations are 
necessary. 
 The  xi vector in this analysis is comprised of a set of proxy financial measures (FV) that 
represent financial performance categories which are considered important indicators of 
borrower credit risk. These categories include leverage, profitability, financial efficiency, 
liquidity, and repayment capacity. The following financial performance measures
7 represent-
ing such categories have been identified from various experimental and statistical credit risk 
assessment models developed by lenders and analysts, and are published in the agricultural 
finance literature (Miller and LaDue, 1989; Turvey, 1991; Splett et al., 1994; Kohl, 2003): 
 
    ■  Debt-Asset Ratio (LEV) representing leverage conditions; 
 
    ■  Return on Assets (ROA), calculated as the ratio of net farm income to total assets, 
as a measure of profitability; 
 
    ■  Net Farm Income Ratio (NFIRAT), calculated as the ratio of net farm income to 
gross revenues, as a measure of financial efficiency; 
 
    ■  Current Ratio (CURAT), calculated as the ratio of Current Assets to Current 
Liabilities, to capture liquidity position; and 
 
    ■  Capital Debt Repayment Margin Ratio (REP), calculated as the ratio of net cash 
margin to the amount of debt servicing requirements, as a measure of repayment 
capacity. 
 
 The  xi vector also consists of a set of dummy structural/demographic variables (ST) that 
are also included to discern whether the loan approval process is significantly influenced by 
gender, size, race, and FSA program considerations. These variables include FM (with a 
value of 1 for a female primary borrower and 0 otherwise to discern gender impact), SIZE 
(which takes on a value of 1 for small farms with gross revenues below $250,000, and 0 
                                                 
7  The financial variables were calculated from historical financial figures compiled by FSA lending offices. They do not include the 




8 NW (with a value of 1 for nonwhite borrowers and 0 otherwise to capture racial 
impact), and DRT (which takes on a value of 1 for loans accommodated under the direct 
lending programs and 0 otherwise). 
  Following Greene (2003), the marginal effects for the probit model, computed at the 
means of xi, are given by: 
 













Heckman Selection Model 
 
The Heckman approach considers the separability of two decisions made by FSA loan 
officers: approval or denial of loan applications and loan amount disbursed to successful 
applicants. This approach produces consistent, asymptotically efficient estimates for all 
parameters in the model being fitted. The Heckman selection model consists of the following 
selection mechanism and outcome equations (Greene, 2003): 
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(7)  Outcome Model:        if 1. ii ii    yx z   
 
  In the first stage, a probit estimation technique generates the selection equation. The 
dichotomous dependent variable is the same variable defined in equation (2). Hence, probit 
regression estimates the probability of success of a loan application. Moreover, the probit 
equation is estimated by maximum likelihood to obtain estimates of the following inverse 
Mill’s ratio, calculated as the ratio of the density () and cumulative () probability density 
functions, for every selected (approved) loan applicant (Greene, 2003): 
 



















  In the second stage, the regression or outcome equation is applied to the selected 
(approved) loan observations to estimate the determinants of the amount of the loan received 
from the FSA. The dependent variable in this equation (yi) is the log transformation of the 
loan amounts of the successful loan applicants [ln(LSIZE)]. The inverse Mill’s ratio is 
included in this estimation as a separate predictor variable. 
  This analysis employs the maximum-likelihood approach, rather than the Heckman two-
step procedure, in estimating the Heckman model. Under the maximum-likelihood method, 
                                                 
8 The cut-off of $250,000 gross revenues for classifying small and large farms is consistent with the USDA/ERS definition of farm typology 
groups (Hoppe, Perry, and Banker, 2000). Additional analyses were made on credit risk analysis standards employed on small and large 




the outcome and selection models are jointly estimated. Previous studies using the Heckman 
approach contend that even with correct model specification, the two-step procedure produces 
less efficient estimates than the full maximum-likelihood method (Sales et al., 2004). 
  In this analysis, the expanded form of the selection and outcome equations is given, 
respectively, as: 
 
(9)          
*
01 2 ii i i   zF V S T     
and 
(10)              01 2 3 . ii i i i     yF V S T R E Q     
 
The FV and ST variables in the selection equation (9) are retained in the outcome equation 
with the addition of a set of variables (REQ) to determine the magnitude of FSA loan 
exposure to successful loan applicants. The REQ variables include WC, an estimate of the 
farm’s working capital requirement (the difference between current assets and current 
liabilities), and asset turnover ratio (ATO), calculated as the ratio of gross farm revenues to 
total farm assets, to account for the productivity of existing farm assets. These variables may 
determine the operating capital and fixed asset loan requirements of a farm business. 
 
The IV Probit Model 
 
The IV probit tool is a maximum-likelihood estimation technique that fits models with dichot-
omous dependent variables and endogenous explanatory variables. For a single endogenous 
regression, the model can be stated as: 
 

















where i = 1, …, N; 
*
1i z is a dichotomous dependent variable; 
*
2i z is a vector of endogenous 
variables; Wi is a vector of exogenous variables; Vi is a vector of instruments that satisfy 
conditions of instrumental exogeneity and relevance;  and  are vectors of structural 
parameters; and 1 and 2 are matrices of reduced-form parameters. The 
*
2i z  equation is 
written in reduced form and both equations are estimated simultaneously using maximum-
likelihood techniques. As a discrete choice model, 
*
1i z  is not observed because the model 
instead fits  i z1 = 1 for 
*
1 0, i  z  and  1i z = 0 for 
*
1 0. i  z  
  In this analysis, the IV probit model is formulated under the assumption that loan amount 
decisions may be made simultaneously with loan approval decisions. Thus, the loan amount 
variable is included in the estimating equation as an instrumented variable. Specifically, the 
model is estimated as follows: 
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1i z  is the same binary dependent variable in equations (2) and (9); ln(LSIZEi), the 
instrumented variable 
*




9 FVi and STi are the same set of financial measures and structural/demographic 
variables, respectively, included in equation (4) and are the exogenous variables (Wi) in this 




Tables 2–5 present the results from various analytical approaches used in this study. The 
descriptive analytical results allow the comparison of mean financial performance values 
across loan decision and gender categories. The econometric results clarify the nature of FSA 
loan approval and amount decisions, validate whether there is gender bias or not, and 





A significance test of the mean differences of financial performance variables reported in 
table 2 indicates that farms with successful loan applications have better profitability, 
repayment, and liquidity conditions than rejected farms. Among racial classes, white farmers 
have significantly larger operations (in terms of assets and revenues) with more favorable 
profitability, financial efficiency, and liquidity results than non-white farmer applicants. 
  Interestingly, while male farmers in the sample have larger gross revenues, their female 
counterparts have significantly better financial efficiency, repayment, and leverage ratios. 
Moreover, larger loan amounts are associated with white, female, and successful loan appli-
cants. 
  Table 3 introduces another layer in the gender class analysis by incorporating the loan 
approval decision classification. At the 95% confidence level, the approved male and female 
applications expectedly have superior financial conditions when compared to their respective 
rejected counterparts. However, comparing inter-gender loan approval decision categories, 
rejected male farm operators have larger farm assets and gross revenues than the rejected 
female applicants. On the other hand, successful female applicants have significantly higher 
repayment, leverage, and financial efficiency ratios than male farm operators with approved 
loans, although the latter have larger gross revenues and better profitability (return on assets) 




As reported in table 4, the 
2 statistic obtained under the LR test of independence applied to 
the Heckman maximum-likelihood model is not significant at the 95% confidence level. This 
result establishes the separability of decisions on the approval/rejection of loan applications 
and the amount of loans disbursed to successful loan applicants. The Wald test of exogeneity 
applied to the alternative IV probit model also yields an insignificant 
2 statistic. This then 
rules out the endogenity of the loan amount in determining loan approval decisions under a 
simultaneous loan approval-amount decision framework.   
                                                 
9 There is a difference in the number of observations for the ln(LSIZE) variable in the Heckman and IV probit models. The latter model 
considers all observations for this variable, while this variable is considered only for successful (selected) loan applications in the Heckman 





 Table 2. Means of Financial Performance Measures by Loan Decision and Racial and 
 Gender Classes   
    Loan Decision  Racial Classes  Gender Classes 
Financial Variables  All  Approved  Rejected  White  Non-White  Male  Female 
Total Assets ($)  504,819    541,593    455,630    549,928
*** 231,560
*** 505,957      496,465   
Total Net Worth ($)  165,461    191,125    131,132    181,485
*** 68,387
*** 159,318      210,554   









*** 59,470      47,705   
Return on Assets (%)  23.21    29.64
** 14.61
** 23.68     20.40     24.00      17.43   







Repayment Margin Ratio  1.36    1.75
*** 0.84
*** 1.40     1.12     1.18
*** 2.67
***




** 1.87      11.05   
Debt-Asset Ratio  0.90    0.76    1.08    0.91     0.81     0.93
*     0.64
*







No. of Observations  367     210    157   315   52    323   44  
 
   Note: Single, double, and triple asterisks (*,**,***) denote significance of pairwise comparison of means at the 90%, 95%, 






 Table 3. Means of Financial Performance Measures of Approved and Rejected Loan 
 Applications by Gender Class 
 
  Male Borrowers    Female Borrowers 
Financial Variables   Approved   Rejected  Approved    Rejected 
Total Assets ($)  529,089       476,471      619,632        258,341      
Total Net Worth ($)  182,086       130,297      247,543        139,041      
Gross Farm Income ($)  313,379       253,507      182,684        136,321      
Net Farm Income ($)  70,212       45,777      60,845        22,302      
Return on Assets (%)  32.12       13.65      14.19        23.71      
Net Profit Margin (%)  24.41       10.56      38.57        15.83      
Repayment Margin Ratio  1.45       0.83      3.58        0.91      
Current Ratio  2.92       0.54      16.45        0.60      
Debt-Asset Ratio  0.78       1.13      0.63        0.67      
Loan Amount ($)  160,228       146,969      299,221        136,893      
No. of Observations      181      142        30      14 
 
 




Table 4. Heckman, Instrumental Variable, and Probit Estimation Results, All Borrowers   
  HECKMAN IV  PROBIT P ROBIT 
 
Variables 
Approval   
Coefficient   
Loan Amt.   




Coefficient   
Marginal   













A. Financial Performance Indicators:        


























































   Working Capital (WC)      5.56e-07
** 
 (2.65e-07) 
   
   Asset Turnover Ratio (ATO)   0.0333 
(0.0228) 
   
B. Structural and Demographic Dummy Variables     

















































C. Log of Loan Size [ln(LSIZE)]








Model’s Explanatory Power (χ
2)     129.64
***     71.18
***     145.13
*** 
Other Model Statistics:  LR Test of Independence 
(χ
2) 






 2.20  0.49    30.81 
 
Notes: Single, double, and triple asterisks (*,**,***) denote significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels, 
respectively. Values in parentheses are standard errors. 
a The instruments used for ln(LSIZE) in the IV Probit model are ROA, CURAT, LEV, REP, NFIRAT, FM, NW, DRT, SIZE, 
WC, and ATO. 
 
  Thus, due to lack of evidence from the independence and endogeneity tests, standard 
probit estimation is justified as the most logical, relevant approach in modeling loan approval 
decisions. Based on the results reported in table 4, only two financial performance variables, 
REP and CURAT, significantly affect loan approval decisions. The coefficient results suggest 
borrowers with stronger historical repayment capacity and liquidity conditions are more likely 
to be successful with loan applications. This finding is consistent with FSA established 
guidelines for credit risk assessment that emphasize the importance of repayment capacity 




among financial performance variables is obtained even under a model that assumes an 
endogenous ln(LSIZE) (IV probit). The REP variable remains the only important financial 
performance variable in the loan approval decision equation of the Heckman model. 
  Among other significant regressors in the probit model, the program dummy variable 
(DRT) coefficient is negatively signed, which suggests applications under the guaranteed 
lending program have a greater chance of approval. It is apparent that the inclusion of a third 
party (the lending institution that has previously assessed the loan application) in a guaranteed 
lending arrangement with the FSA can enhance the likelihood of loan approval. 
  The significant, negative SIZE dummy coefficient indicates larger operations tend to 
succeed more with loan applications than smaller farms. In contrast, the ln(LSIZE) negative 
coefficient suggests borrowers with lower loan amount requests are more likely to be 
successful with loan applications. This decision criterion reflects the FSA fund availability 
situation where finite, limited allocations are usually exhausted before the end of each fiscal 
year. The FSA challenge has always been to assist as many eligible, creditworthy borrowers 
as possible rather than using up sizeable portions of the funding allocations on just a few 
farms with large loan requirements. 
  Focusing on the gender issue, there are two compelling pieces of evidence in this analysis 
that counter the “commonality” claim of the women farmer plaintiffs in the Love v. Johanns 
case. First, the gender dummy variable (FM) coefficient has been consistently insignificant in 
all variations (Heckman, IV probit, and probit versions) of the estimating equation, thus 
indicating that applicant gender may not influence loan approval decisions. Second, as can be 
gleaned from results of separate probit estimations made for male and female borrowers 
focusing solely on loan size and financial performance variables (table 5), there appears to be 
no gross disparity in the objective criteria for loan approval decisions in the two delineated 
gender models. Both models produce coefficient significance for a common financial per-
formance variable (REP), with the male borrower model adding a second significant regressor 
(CURAT) coefficient. 
  Statistical test results on the differences between significant coefficient estimates for 
regressors in the male and female borrower models are also reported in table 5. The Wald χ
2 
statistic for evaluating the significance of statistical difference is calculated as: 
 













where bM and bW are the coefficient estimates for the male and female models, respectively, 
and s.e.(·) denotes the corresponding estimated standard errors. The Wald 
2 statistic derived 
for each variable has one degree of freedom. 
  Results for the probit coefficient difference tests suggest that only the REP criterion had a 
significantly stronger influence on loan approval decisions among male borrowers vis-à-vis 
their female counterparts. In terms of marginal effects, a unit change in the REP measure will 
result in a 0.7452 increase in the probability of loan approval among male borrowers, while 
the applicable effect among female borrowers is only 0.0006. As reported in table 2, female 
borrowers have significantly better repayment ratios than male borrowers, whose mean REP 
only barely exceeds 1.0. It appears this general notion has led lending officers to cautiously 




Table 5. Probit Coefficient Differences for Male and Female Borrowers   









Marginal   
Effect   
 
Coefficient   
Marginal    
Effect    
Intercept  −0.2515 
(0.9516) 
  −0.0172 
(2.9571) 
 0.01 
Return on Assets (ROA) 0.0451 
(0.1806) 
0.0146  −1.2590 
(0.8079) 
−0.0007 2.48 
























Log of Loan Size [ln(LSIZE)] 0.0232 
(0.0821) 




2      114.05
***      22.29
***  
 
Notes: Single, double, and triple asterisks (*,**,***) denote significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels, 
respectively. Values in parentheses are standard errors. 
 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
Drawing upon the allegations of the plaintiffs and the 2,000 women farmers across the 
country who provided supporting testimonies in the Love v. Johanns lawsuits, a sampling of 
Georgia FSA borrowers is analyzed to verify any gender bias in the loan approval decisions 
made by FSA lending officers during a four-year period (1999–2002). The findings of this 
analysis are consistent with the judicial courts’ contention of a lack of commonality in the 
loan and business circumstances of rejected female loan applicants. Specifically, this analysis 
does not produce any overwhelming evidence of discrimination against Georgia female loan 
applicants in FSA loan approval decisions given the extent of representation afforded here of 
factors considered in the loan approval decision process. Contrary to allegations, results of 
varied versions of the lending decision model (incorporating separability, endogeneity, and 
exogeneity issues in loan approval and amount decisions) indicate that borrower gender has 
not been a significant consideration in such decisions. 
  Caution, however, must be observed in interpreting the econometric results considering 
the small proportion of loan applications filed by women farmers relative to the sample size. 
The task of compiling an adequately acceptable multistate data set for this analysis can 
certainly be difficult, if not completely infeasible. While documentation for approved loan 
accounts is readily available in any FSA lending office nationwide, such is not the case for 
rejected loans—which are complicated by a serious lack of official and unofficial documen-
tation for cases of loan rejection. For one thing, certain applications fail to progress through 
the loan approval process because of insufficient supporting loan documents. Moreover, 
quick rejection decisions through phone calls or face-to-face interviews between the loan 




  This investigation takes advantage of the rare availability of a data set representing both 
the successes and failures of FSA loan applications. Notwithstanding its limitations, this 
study is a significant attempt in presenting important evidence that can motivate further 
investigation of the commonality issue of gender discrimination, hopefully using a more 
geographically extensive data set to capture a greater number of borrower experiences and 
more aspects of the entire spectrum of lending decisions. 
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